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The Dual Aspect Model of Moral Behavior: An Experimental Test 
of Piaget’s Theory of Affective-Cognitive Parallelism 
Georg LIND1 
Introduction 
Half a century ago, Jean Piaget suggested a new approach to 
the study of moral (and non-moral) behavior which we have called Dual Aspect 
Model, and which, as we shall see, has opened up a new, very prosperous field 
of research into the nature and development of human morality. When I came 
across Piaget’s suggestion, in the early 1970s, I was thrilled. I imagined that if 
this notion, which has received little attention in research on moral behavior 
and development, were fully understood, it could revolutionize psychology 
and education. I felt that this theory could solve some of the most troubling 
problems of moral psychology, foremost the definition and measurement of 
moral competence, a notion which Lawrence Kohlberg (1964) had just introduced. 
The central postulates of Piaget’s new approach are:  
“The two aspects, affective and cognitive, are at the same time insepa-
rable and irreducible” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 158, emphasis add-
ed).  
“Although cognitive and affective factors are indissociable in an indi-
viduals' concrete behavior, they appear to be different in nature” (Pia-
get, 1981, p. 3).  
“Sentiments express the interests and values of actions, intelligence 
constitutes the structure” (Piaget, 1951, p. 220). 
To my knowledge, Piaget did not develop a specific testable 
hypothesis or measurement method on the basis of his dual aspect model. Yet 
in several of his writings he suggested a general hypothesis, namely he predict-
ed that both aspects would be closely correlated: “We [...] find a marked paral-
lelism in their respective evolutions” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 21). “We shall 
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be able to put intellectual structures and the levels of affective development in parallel, 
stage by stage” (Piaget, 1981, p. 12). 
In the past three decades my colleagues and I have used the 
Dual-Aspect-Theory to develop a new approach to the measurement of affec-
tive and cognitive aspects of moral behavior as distinct yet inseparable aspects, 
the Moral Judgment Test (Lind 1978; 2008 a). We also explicated Piaget’s assump-
tion of an affective-cognitive parallelism. We hypothesized that the higher peo-
ple’s moral competence (cognitive aspect) is, the more pronounced they prefer 
higher order moral orientations, and the more they reject lower order moral 
orientation. We have shown elsewhere that Piaget’s notion has powerful impli-
cations for moral psychology and education (Lind, 2002; 2009; 2008 b; 2010 b). 
In this paper I want to show that the Piagetian prediction can be experimentally 
corroborated. 
The slow progress of “soft psychology” 
In order to understand the revolutionary implications of Pia-
get’s notion of affect and cognition being two inseparable but distinguishable 
aspects for moral psychology (and beyond), we need to review the hidden as-
sumptions underlying mainstream psychology. These hidden assumptions, it 
seems, are so powerful that they have prevented us for a long time from under-
standing the difference between aspects and components of behavior and the im-
portance of this distinction for the progress of psychological research and edu-
cational practice. Maybe the importance of this distinction would be more 
readily accepted if the reasons for the slow progress of “soft psychology” 
(Meehl, 1978) were better understood. 
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In spite of a vast amount of experimental studies, the science of 
psychology is making only slow, if any progress. As Wittgenstein (1953)2 ar-
gued, this is not so much because of a lack of experimental and statistical meth-
ods but because of a lack of conceptual parsimony and clarity. In psychology 
‘complexity’ is adored, not simplicity. Most psychologists seem to assume that 
all behavior is complex. However, complexity lies in the eyes of the beholder. 
Anything that we do not yet understand appears to be complex. But once we 
understand things they can look quite simple. It seems that our deep belief in 
complexity makes most of us rest content with not understanding psychological 
processes. 
In the Dark Ages of medieval times, natural science was handi-
capped by a similar thinking. This handicap was overcome only when it was 
discovered that theories about nature must not be confused with nature itself, 
and the highest virtue of a good theory was parsimony of concepts. One of the 
pioneers of this new thinking was William of Occam (1285 - 1349). “Occam’s 
razor” became proverbial: Entities should not be multiplied without necessity 
(“entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate”). Rigorous striving for simplici-
ty has made modern science and technology possible. Only if predictions are 
simple (not simplistic!) and clear, they can be tested for information value and 
empirical truth (Popper, 1968). Only knowledge which can be presented in the 
form of a simple theory can be taught and can be transformed into powerful 
technologies. 
Moral psychology is still far from this ideal. Consider, for ex-
ample, this influential definition of the new concept of “moral foundations:” 
They “are not values or virtues. They are the psychological systems that give 
                                                 
2 The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its 
state is not compatible with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. ... For in psychology there 
are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. The existence of experimental methods makes us 
think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and methods pass 
one another by.” (Wittgenstein, 1953, chapter xiv) 
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children feelings and intuitions that make local stories, practices, and moral ar-
guments more or less appealing during the editing process. [...] The foundations 
are the main ‘evolved psychological mechanisms’ that are part of the ‘first draft’ 
of the moral mind” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1031). It is difficult, if possible at all, 
to imagine how this complex concept can be observed or measured in an objec-
tive way. The authors saw no other way to resolve this problem than through 
measurement by fiat: “The items were written to be face-valid measures of con-
cerns related to the five foundations” (p. 1032)3. 
Yet if there is no clear and consistent relation between concept 
and method of observation or measurement, there is no valid base for testing 
theories and for reaching an agreement on the truth of theories on the basis of 
scientific research. Otherwise agreement on truth would be a matter of social 
power and status. We can test the empirical validity of concepts only if the 
method of observation is consistent with these concepts, that is, if our measure-
ment is theoretically valid. If the validity of our measurement is unknown, we 
cannot be sure whether the data we get from measurement falsify our theory or 
the measurement. Not only the development of good theories depends on good 
measurement, but good measurement depends also on good theories. “Good 
                                                 
3 The problems which we discuss here are not confined to moral psychology but trouble psychology and 
the social sciences as a whole. As Jane Loevinger (1976) noted, “many methods [of measurement] are 
flawed. They do not coordinate concept type with scoring algorithm, they confuse distributions with 
profiles, and they use rules and parameters that are arbitrary to the point of caprice. For measurement to 
serve as the leading edge of a scientific discipline, it must be informed by theory, and there must be 
clear lines for results to feed back as corrections to theory. Most of the approaches have inadequate ar-
ticulation of theory, method, and data” (p. 240). Similarly the social psychologist W. A. Scott (1968) 
argues that “perhaps the most influential, and certainly the best developed source is psychometric theo-
ry, or the theory of mental tests (for example, Gulliksen, 1950). Though currently under fire for its inad-
equacies [...], it at least has the virtue of explicitness, which renders its inadequacies obvious” (p. 208). 
George A. Miller (1969), former president of the American Psychological Association noted: “What is 
lacking is a psychological theory that dictates explicitly which items should be included on the test. 
Then the criterion would be used, not to validate the test, but to validate the theory on which the test 
was based. Such an explicit theory – if it were true – would resolve all doubts as to whether or not the 
test actually measured what it was intended to measure. Questions of validity would be transferred to 
the larger domain of psychological theory in general, and the tests would become an instrument of re-
search comparable in power and dignity to experiments conducted in the laboratory. [...] The current 
trend [...] is toward the explicit use of psychological theory in constructing new tests. With this changed 
emphasis the psychometric problem enters a new phase, less technical and more scientific” (p. 369). 
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theories” means that we clarify and simplify our theoretical concepts, that is, 
that we clarify what our concepts empirically mean and rid our concepts of un-
defined terminology and unnecessary assumptions. Otherwise, we cannot 
know whether our theory or our method is wrong.  
In moral psychology, Piaget has contributed much to he clarifi-
cation of the two concepts of moral affect and moral cognition in his writings, 
especially in Moral Judgment of the Child (Piaget, 1965) and his article on the 
measurement of the cognitive-structural aspect (Piaget, 1971): “Structures [...] 
are expressed in regular forms of responses that we believe we are discovering 
in the subject's behavior. We also feel that if the underlying structures did not 
exist, we would not be able to explain such behavior. But the subject is not 
aware of these structures. He is not a professor of psychology. ... He simply us-
es them” (p. 3). 
Similarly Kohlberg, in his Heinz Werner Memorial Lectures, 
discussed at length the problem of coupling concept and method of moral psy-
chology (Kohlberg, 1984): “One who seeks to locate responses with regard to 
underlying structure makes a distinction between 'achievement' and 'process' 
[...] In order to arrive at the underlying structure of a response, one must  con-
struct a test, [...] so that the questions and the response to them allow for an un-
ambiguous inference to be drawn as to the underlying structure. [...] The test 
constructor must postulate structure from the start, as opposed to inductively 
finding structure in content after the test is made. [...] If a test is to yield stage 
structure, a concept of that structure must be built into the initial act of observa-
tion, test construction, and scoring; it will not emerge through pure factor-
analytic responses classified by content” (pp. 401 - 402). Already at the outset of 
his research into moral behavior and development, Kohlberg (1958) postulated 
that “a moral act or attitude cannot be defined either by purely cognitive or by purely 
motivational criteria” (p. 16; emphasis added, GL). 
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Yet, in spite of these prominent voices, moral psychology is still 
plagued with the lack of agreement between method and concept. Most psy-
chologists still seem to believe that the arduous process of defining and clarify-
ing concepts like affect and cognition in the moral domain can be short-cut 
through statistical methods. In their seminal study into the nature of deceit, 
Hartshorne and May (1928) argue: “If [the test] can be shown to be reliable, then 
it is ipso facto a valid measure of the particular behavior in question in the par-
ticular types of situation embodied in the test.” In a footnote they define validi-
ty as “the square root of its reliability” (p. 142). Similarly, Kohlberg (1984) ar-
gues that “from the point of view of stage theories like Piaget’s or mine, test 
reliability and test construct validity are one and the same thing” (p. 424). This 
is of course false. Obviously some authors confuse the statistical concept of reli-
ability4 or consistency with psychological consistency. Statistical consistency of 
responses of a sample of participants is something totally different from the con-
sistency of an individual’s answers. In a sample the rank order of individuals 
regarding their test scores can persist over some time (which would show in a 
high reliability coefficient) and still each individual may respond rather incon-
sistently. Neither must the consistency of test-scores be confused with the theo-
retical validity of a test of moral attitude or competence. We can measure an 
object very reliably and not know what we are measuring. 
Some moral psychologists argue that modern statistical models 
like Item-Response-Theory define and clarify the objects of measurement. 
However, these models also rest on questionable psychological assumptions 
that are hidden in allegedly methodological decisions. The IRT rests, among 
other things, on the assumption that all responses to test-items  are distributed 
                                                 
4 Reliability can mean that participants’ scores on a test taken at one point of time correlate very closely 
with their scores at another time (“re-test reliability”); in other words that, for example, they do not de-
velop morally, or that they all develop at the same rate so that their ranking on the test remains perfectly 
stable. It is a completely different question whether a test really measures what it purports to measure. A 
test can be very reliable but measuring the wrong thing. 
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in the same way (usually “normality” is assumed), and that responses are line-
arly related with the “underlying trait”. If the data do not fit this expectation, 
many test-constructors exchange the test-items which do not seem to “work.” In 
other words, “the measurer has cheated the validity test by using empirical evi-
dence to modify the […] construct” (Wilson, 2005, p. 161). Originally, the as-
sumption of normal (bell-shaped) distribution was developed for the statistical 
treatment of errors of measurement. Yet, psychologists adapted this concept 
prematurely to the distribution of human traits. In her very influential textbook 
on personality, Anastasi (1958) postulated: “Many of the distributions found in 
differential psychology likewise fit the mathematical specification of a normal 
curve, especially when they are obtained through the use of carefully construct-
ed measuring instruments with large representative groups” (p. 28). Similarly, 
the moral psychologists May and Hartshorne (1926) rely on this assumption: 
“All we can do is to fall back on the normal curve and use the SD [standard de-
viation] as our unit” (p. 153), though they bear some caveats in mind (see be-
low). Sprinthall et al. (1994) also argue that “many behavioral measures in edu-
cational psychology conform to what statisticians call the normal curve. [...] So 
many measurements come so close to this ideal that it is of utmost importance” 
(pp. 435 - 436). None of these authors provide experimental evidence for their 
belief. For many psychologists normal distribution of human traits has become 
a religious belief5. 
Yet this belief is wrong. Only the distribution of measurement 
error is ‘normal or bell-shaped6, not the distribution of moral or other traits. In 
their seminal experimental studies into the nature of deceit, May and Hartshorne 
(1926) concede: “It may be questioned [...] whether we are justified in assuming 
                                                 
5 “It is a fortunate coincidence that the measurements of many variables in all disciplines have distribu-
tions that are good approximations of the normal distribution. Stated differently, ‘God loves the normal 
curve!’” (Hopkins & Glass, 1978, p. 95). 
6 “I know of scarcely anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful form of cosmic order 
expressed by the ‘Law of Frequency of Error’ ” (Galton, 1889, p. 66). 
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the normal distribution of such a tendency as dishonesty and basing a scale on 
this assumption” (p. 147). Moreover, “an investigation of the distributional 
characteristics of 440 large-sample achievement and psychometric measures 
found all to be significantly non-normal at the alpha .01 significance level” 
(Micceri, 1989, p. 156). If our measurement results in normally distributed data 
we should not see this as confirming the validity of our data but as a hint that 
our measurement has produced mostly error. 
Also the belief of test-psychologists that all (latent) traits would 
be mono-causally related to the measurement data is wrong. Observed behavior 
is hardly ever, or never, solely the function of the mental states of the observed 
person, nor is it solely a function of one isolated mental state. Most, if not all, 
observed behavior is also a response to situational variables, foremost a re-
sponse to the observation itself. In interviews and tests, the participants’ reac-
tion is not only determined by the targeted trait but also by the wording of the 
questions, by certain traits of the interviewer, by the perceived purpose of the 
interview, by the participants’ desire to be socially accepted, and by many other 
features of the person and the interview-situation. Wuttke (2007) has shown 
that test-data in school achievement tests are determined by more than one fac-
tor. The same is true for tests of moral judgment behavior (Lind, 1978; Ander-
son, 1991). The co-determinants of responses are not random (“measurement 
error”) but are mostly systematic and thus part of participants’ personality and 
of the experimental situation. Therefore, the alleged characteristics of tests like 
‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ are as much a characteristic of the participants who 
supplied the data than of the test itself. The conventional attribution of response 
inconsistency to the test is a matter of belief rather than of scientific reasoning 
(Lind, 2010 c). The false attribution of consistency to the test and the test items 
is immunized against falsification by statistical methods of “item analysis” and 
“item selection.” If test-scores do not seem to be consistent enough, one tries to 
identify the items which are to be blamed for this, and replace them with new 
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items which produce a better fit of the response pattern with the expectation 
that all behavior is consistent, thus immunizing dubious theories against falsifi-
cation. 
Neither Piaget, nor Kohlberg, nor many neo-Piagetian and neo-
Kohlbergian researchers are free from such ‘saving circularities’ either. When 
Piaget (1965) set out to study the moral judgment of the child he believed that ide-
ally this should be done through direct experimental observation (p. 115). Yet 
he argues that “you cannot make a child act in a laboratory in order to dissect 
his moral conduct” (p. 112). Hence, “it is the moral judgment that we propose to 
investigate, not moral behavior or sentiment” (p. 7). He argues that this meth-
odological shift would not impede the validity of his data; he assumed that “the 
things that children say to us constitute, as compared to their real conduct, a 
conscious realization or a 'derivation' reflection” (p. 115). To support this belief, 
Piaget points at “the results of our method [which] are relatively constant and, 
above all, they evolve with a certain regularity according to age” (p. 120). How-
ever he concedes that his belief can be challenged: “But there may also be no 
connection whatever between the two. On this view, the child’s moral theories 
would be mere chatter, unrelated to his concrete evaluations. [...] It may be for 
the benefit of the adult rather than for his own use that the child gives his an-
swers” (p. 117). Moreover, Piaget was aware of the multiple determination of 
test responses: “Verbal evaluations made by our children are not of actions of 
which they have been authors or witnesses, but of stories which have been told 
to them. The child's evaluations will, therefore, be verbal, as it were, to the se-
cond degree” (p. 119). Indeed, correlation with age would be a sign of validity 
of measures of morality only if we could be sure that there is no stagnation and 
no regression. But we can test this assumption only if the measurement has not 
been immunized against regression through item selection and scoring. 
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Even modern ‘cognitive neuroscience’ suffers from the same 
lack of coupling concept and method and from a Pre-Occamite multitude of 
undefined entities. As the neuroscientist Sharma Borg (2008) observes: “While 
this classic distinction has been useful in initial efforts to sort out the neural un-
derpinnings of sociomoral behavior, the terms 'reason,' 'emotion,' 'intellect,' or 
'cognition' are commonly used in the scientific literature without defining what 
they are supposed to mean […] Perhaps the emerging field of moral neurosci-
ence hasn't defined the terms 'emotion,' 'reason,' 'cognition,' 'intellect,' etc. be-
cause we aren't yet sure what they are” (pp. 161-162). Perhaps because of this 
conceptual confusion, some eminent cognitive (!) neuroscientists belief that 
moral behavior can be explained without reference to cognition (Haidt, 2001; 
Greene, 2008; Graham et al., 2009). Unfortunately, neuroscience has developed 
largely disconnected from the large body of Piagetian and Kohlbergian moral 
psychology. The exceptional study by the neuroscientists Kristin Prehn and her 
colleagues (2008) lets us sense how fruitful a cooperation between both para-
digms of moral science could be. In this study, the authors used the Dual As-
pect Theory to explain neural activations elicited by a moral decision-making 
task. They show that this activation is highly correlated (r = 0.40) with (cogni-
tive) moral competence, refuting the radical emotivist theory of Zajonc (1980), 
Haidt (2001), and others. 
Component Approaches in Moral Psychology 
Moral psychology, like main stream psychology, has embraced, 
and still embraces, component models of human behavior. Component models 
are deeply entrenched in our research practice as well as in our educational in-
stitutions. They entail certain ways of moral measurement (separate instru-
ments for each component) and certain moral classroom practices (separate 
methods for the various components). Some describe the components explicitly. 
They single out cognitive, affective, behavioral and other components, describe 
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ways of measuring these components separately, and propose educational 
methods of fostering them separately. Others do not state explicitly their theo-
retical model though their methods of measurement and education are ob-
viously based on a component model, because they describe them as separable. 
 As we have already seen, even Piaget often leans toward a 
component model. He talks about affect and cognition as if they were separable. 
“Affective life, similar to intellectual life, is continuous adaptation, and both of 
these adaptations are not only parallel but interdependent [...]” (Piaget, 1951, p. 
220). “We shall be able to put intellectual structures and the levels of affective 
development in parallel, stage by stage” (Piaget, 1981, p. 12). “Parallelism be-
tween intelligence and affectivity would require that analogues of conservation 
and operations be found in the affective domain” (p. 13). No doubt, Piaget was 
convinced that affect and cognition, morality and intelligence were closely re-
lated, but his treatment of them implies that he thought of them as separable 
components. In the table of developmental stages, he listed them side by side as 
separable kinds of behavior (Piaget, 1981, p. 14). 
In contrast, for Kohlberg affect and cognition were so closely re-
lated that he even did not distinguish them clearly in his stage theory of moral 
development. “A systematic general observation of moral behavior, attitudes, 
or concepts in terms of such a set of formal criteria of morality [...] cross-cuts the 
usual neat distinctions between moral knowledge or beliefs on the one hand 
and moral behavior or motivation on the other, since a moral act or attitude 
cannot be defined either by purely cognitive or by purely motivational criteria” 
(Kohlberg 1958, p. 16). However, as we have also seen, Piaget argued that in-
separable does not mean indistinguishable. For example, we cannot separate 
the size of a ball from its weight because both are aspects or properties of the 
ball, not separable components like air and rubber. Yet we can clearly distin-
guish the aspects “size” and “weight” and can measure them independently. 
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Analogously, we should be able to distinguish affective and cognitive aspects 
and measure them independently, even though we cannot separate them nor 
can we measure them separately (Lind, 1978; 2008 a; 2010 b).  
Component models of moral behavior are en vogue in current 
moral psychology. Rest (1984), who considers his theory “Neo-Kohlbergian,” 
suggested a four component model (cf. also Rest et al., 1999). Apparently he 
supposes that these components can be separated from each other. Consequent-
ly separate tests have been proposed for measuring each component. From the 
point of view of neo-Piagetian and neo-Kohlbergian theorizing, this is a ques-
tionable assumption. As Higgins (1995) points out: “However, one should note 
that there are cognitive aspects to all of Rest's components, and Kohlberg's idea 
of a stage as a structured whole or a world view cuts across Rest's component 
model” (p. 53). Rest’s component model is clearly at odds with Piaget’s aspect-
model. 
Similarly, neuroscientists often use a component-language 
when talking about the relationship between emotion/affect and cognition (cf. 
Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2008). Yet, as Greene (2008) observes, “often ‘cognition’ is 
used in a […] sense that contrasts with ‘emotion,’ despite the fact that emotions 
involve information processing” (p. 40)7. 
Moral Competence 
Moral competence is broadly defined as the ability we need to 
apply our moral ideals in every-day life, especially to resolve moral conflicts. 
This definition is derived from Kohlberg’s definition of moral judgment compe-
tence as “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., 
based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments” 
(Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425). Initially, Kohlberg wrote that moral (judgment) compe-
                                                 
7 In fact, it is hard to envision an “emotional dog which wags with his cognitive tail” (Haidt, 2001) with-
out cognition that controls its tail wagging. 
 
 
Volume 5 – Edição Especial – Set/2013  16 
www.marilia.unesp.br/scheme  
ISSN: 1984-1655 
tence could be studied through observing children when they were confronted 
with a (difficult) moral task: “We felt that it would be easier to analyze qualita-
tively a case in which the situation demanded more than a child could respond 
to than to analyze a case in which a child wanted more challenge than the situa-
tion could provide” (Kohlberg, 1958, p. 76). For this purpose he developed a 
new method of assessment, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). Like Piaget, he 
confronted children with stories. Initially he was not interested in children’s 
theories about right or wrong but in the structure of their behavior. He probed 
into participants’ moral judgment competence by asking why-questions and by 
confronting them with counter-arguments. “The responses of subjects to the 
dilemmas and their subsequent responses to clinical probing are taken to re-
flect, exhibit, or manifest the structure” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 407). 
Later Kohlberg and his colleagues lost sight of this structural 
approach to the measurement of moral judgment competence, when they 
changed their measurement method in order to save a core assumption of cog-
nitive-developmental theory from refutation (Lind, 1989). When Kohlberg and 
Kramer’s (1969) longitudinal study produced cases of regression, Kohlberg and 
his associate did not accept these as a refutation of their postulate of “invariant 
sequence” but argued that the regressions were due to measurement error. 
Therefore, he and his associates created a new methodological postulate, name-
ly that “the validity criterion of moral judgment development is [...] that of an 
organization passing through invariant stages” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 194). “Before 
you try to explain data of change and development with a cognitive-
developmental theory, make sure your data can be observed with a measure 
you have made up to fit the sequence rule” (p. 424). After modifying the scoring 
of the MJI, “as one would expect of a developmental variable, our data show a 
clear relationship between age and moral judgment stage. The correlation be-
tween age and MMS [Moral Maturity Score; GL] was .78” (Colby & Kohlberg, 
1987, p. 47).  
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However, this success was achieved at the expense of the scien-
tific dignity of cognitive-developmental theory. The postulate of invariant se-
quence has become immunized against refutation. As Popper (1968) argues, a 
theory which cannot be refuted by data is pre-scientific at best. And the success 
did not last long. Studies clearly show that moral competence can regress 
(Helkama et al., 2003; Lind, 2000; Lind, 2002). Although many Kohlbergians still 
argue that tests of moral developmental must correlate highly with age in order 
to be accepted as a valid measure, some chief proponents have silently given up 
this criterion of test validity (e.g., Colby 2008, p. 393). 
But this is not the whole story. As I have shown elsewhere 
(Lind, 2010 a), regressions can be better explained if we adopt the dual aspect 
model, that is if we measures the two aspects simultaneously but not in a con-
fused way. In Kohlberg’s interview method both aspects are befuddled, even 
though in his methodological writings he distinguished the two aspects. On the 
one hand, Kohlberg defined “stages solely in terms of cognitive structures, or 
ways of thinking or judging” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 398). “The primary theoretical 
definition of structural moral development is that of an organization passing 
through invariant sequential stages” (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 44; emphasis added, 
GL). On the other hand, Kohlberg also defined his “stages” in terms of moral 
affects, i.e., moral orientations, attitudes and motivation. “The present research 
deals with the interrelated development of basic moral concepts and attitudes” 
(Kohlberg, 1958, p. 1; first sentence!) He states that the six (or five) stages of 
moral development could be characterized by different moral orientations un-
derlying thinking and behavior (Kohlberg, 1976). At another place he argues 
“that the judgment of whether an act is morally right or good, morally bad or 
wrong, or morally neutral can be decided only by studying the moral judg-
ments and motivations which inform it” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 393). Yet, in spite of 
the fact that he saw moral behavior and development as defined by two dif-
ferent aspects, he proposed only one index for moral development (“stages” or 
 
 
Volume 5 – Edição Especial – Set/2013  18 
www.marilia.unesp.br/scheme  
ISSN: 1984-1655 
“moral maturity score”), confounding the two aspects. “By this definition [...], 
subjects at each higher stage were more likely to act morally in that they were 
more likely to make judgments of responsibility consistent with their deontic 
choice and to act on this judgment” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 523). For example, a par-
ticipant’s responses are scored as “Stage 6” only if she shows strongest prefer-
ence for Stage 6-type moral reasoning and, at the same time, does so consistent-
ly across situations8. Because of this confounding, the stage score goes down if 
the scores on either aspect goes down. The confounded measurement does not 
let us say which one. If we measure both aspects un-confoundedly (not sepa-
rately!), as the MJT allows us to do, we find regression only in regard to moral 
competence (cognitive aspect), not in regard to the affective aspect. Moral orien-
tations remain largely stable, they do not regress (Lind, 2010 a). 
  
                                                 
8 This requirement might explain why in MJI-studies only very few participants are found with Stage-6 
scores. Some of the dilemma-stories in the MJI do not seem to require Stage-6 type moral orientations, 
restraining the scores to the first five “stage”-types not because participants cannot reason on higher 
stages but because of the method of measurement used (cf. Lind, 1989). 
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Piaget’s Affective-Cognitive Parallelism Hypothesis 
Piaget (1981) hypothesized that affective and cognitive aspects 
of human behavior develop simultaneously9. “We shall be able to put intellec-
tual structures and the levels of affective development in parallel, stage by 
stage” (p. 12). “Affective life, similar to intellectual life, is continuous adapta-
tion, and both of these adaptations are not only parallel but interdependent, 
since sentiments express the interests and values of actions, intelligence consti-
tutes the structure” (Piaget, 1951, p. 220)10. 
What developmental parallelism would mean concretely is 
much debated in research literature. Kuhn et al. (1977) argue that both aspects 
of moral development are parallel but that cognitive (logical) development al-
ways precedes moral development, while Nunner-Winkler (1989) concludes 
that the parallelism hypothesis should be given up. However, Lind defends 
Piaget’s assumption of parallel development of affective and cognitive aspects 
of moral behavior (Lind, 2002; 2010 b). 
Corollaries of Piaget’s parallelism hypothesis can be found in 
the works of Kohlberg and Rest. Kohlberg (1958) wrote at the beginning of his 
dissertation that his “research deals with the interrelated development of basic 
moral concepts and attitudes” (p. 1). For him “it seemed to be a fact that quanti-
tative consistency in the type [of moral orientation] was associated with qualita-
tive extremeness in expressing its underlying 'principle' ” (p. 94). Even more 
                                                 
9 “[Piaget] spoke about affectivity in a broad sense as the energetic source on which the functioning of 
intelligence depends, drawing the analogy of affectivity as the fuel that makes the motor of intelligence 
go. [...] need, interest, effort, [...] attraction” (DeVries, 1997, p. 6). 
10 Piaget seems not to be immune against confusing the aspect model with the component model, at least 
implicitly. Talking of “affective life” as distinct from “intellectual life” could be easily mistaken as im-
plying separate components of life. Or read this: “We have assumed that affective decentering is a cor-
relative of cognitive decentering, not because one dominates the other, but because both occur as a re-
sult of a single integrated process" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 26) Using the term “affective decenter-
ing” implies that affects are substances that can spread out, and using the term “cognitive decentering” 
could mean that decentering and cognition are something different. They are not. Decentering, as Piaget 
says elsewhere, is a way of describing cognitive properties of the human mind. 
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elaborated is Rest’s formulation of the parallelism hypothesis: “[T]here is evi-
dence that higher moral judgment scores reflect greater capacity and are not 
merely differences in preference. Studies of moral comprehension indicate that 
those subjects with higher moral judgment scores also have higher moral com-
prehension scores, and that subjects with lower moral judgment scores have 
lower comprehension” (Rest, 1988, p. 188). In this statement, the cognitive as-
pect is defined as comprehension of moral arguments made by others, and the af-
fective aspect is defined as the preference for post-conventional moral reasoning. 
Similarly, Montada (1993) argues that there is a functional link between both 
aspects by hypothesizing that moral emotions presuppose perceptions or ‘cog-
nitions’ of situations. “These cognitions do not need to be reflected or objective-
ly true, nor do they need to be verbalized or conscious. Nonetheless, they are 
functional for the arousal of [moral] emotions.” (p. 272).  
Today, half a century after Piaget, contemporary moral neuro-
science has re-discovered affective-cognitive parallelism, obviously without 
being aware of Piagetian moral psychology: “The ventromedial and dorsolat-
eral systems do not typically act in isolation, however, and neither do whatever 
we instinctively mean by 'reason' and 'emotion;' they act in parallel and with 
constant interaction” (Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008, p. 162). 
Piaget quoted much supportive evidence, yet he did not explic-
itly state how both aspects and their elements should be measured, nor did he 
design or conduct experimental studies in order to test this general hypothesis. 
In particular he did not solve the self-imposed problem of operationalizing the 
two aspects as aspects and not as components, that is, of designing an instru-
ment which lets us measure both aspects independently as aspects of one and 
the same pattern of behavior, but not with separate tests of separate behaviors 
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Therefore, in order to put the hypothesis of correlational paral-
lelism to the test, we need to state it more precisely. We predict that, if Piaget’s 
hypothesis is true, moral affect and moral cognition relate in such a way that 
people will prefer more adequate moral orientations, and reject inadequate moral orien-
tations, the higher their ability to make moral judgments. We should, however, keep 
in mind that this prediction will only be confirmed by empirical studies if the 
participants have no reason to fake their moral orientations upward (e.g., if they 
have good reasons to believe that the test is for high stakes), or if the partici-
pants lack motivation to perform at their actual level of moral competence. In 
both cases, the prediction may still be supported by the data but not as clearly 
as we should expect. 
Method 
To test Piaget’s hypothesis of affective-cognitive parallelism 
(that is, our more specific reformulation of this hypothesis), we used the Moral 
Judgment Test (MJT) (Lind, 1978; 2008 a). In line with Piaget’s concept of dis-
tinct-but-not-separable aspects, we have designed the MJT to measure both as-
pects simultaneously, moral orientations and moral competence, producing two 
distinct sets of scores for each aspect. 
A competence test is defined by the task it contains. Thus a test 
of moral competence must contain a moral task: “In studying moral behavior 
we are concerned with studying action in which the subject gives up something 
or takes risks where not doing so would appear to be to his or her immediate 
advantage. [...] Thus, it is the overcoming of these situational pressures on ei-
ther a verbal or a physical level that constitutes the test of moral behavior” 
(Kohlberg, 1984, p. 522). 
As in Kohlberg’s clinical moral judgment interviews, the MJT 
confronts the participant with a short story about a person in a dilemma situa-
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tion. In the standard version of the MJT, two stories are used, the Doctor story 
and the Workers story. The participant is to give her or his opinion on whether 
the actor’s solution of the dilemma was wrong or right on a scale from -3 to +3. 
This part of the MJT is not used for assigning a test score. Rather it sets the stage 
for the moral task the participant is to solve11. Subsequently, the participants are 
asked to judge for each story six arguments supporting their opinion on the 
protagonist’s decision, and six opposing their opinion on scales from -4 (“I 
strongly reject”) to +4 (“I strongly agree”). The arguments have been selected 
(or constructed) to differ clearly in regard to their moral quality. To achieve this 
each argument represents one of the six types of moral orientation as defined by 
Kohlberg. Thus the six Kohlbergian types of moral orientation are represented 
by four arguments in the MJT. 
The moral task of the MJT is to rate arguments supporting the partic-
ipant’s opinion on the protagonist’s decision, and arguments opposing his or her opin-
ion according to their moral quality but not in regard to their opinion agreement. For 
people at the lowest level of moral judgment competence, even the requirement 
to deal with arguments at all represents a very difficult task; they refuse to rate 
any of the arguments. A participant asked: “Why do I have to answer these 
questions after I did say my opinion on the issue.” Participants at a somewhat 
more advanced level strongly agree with all arguments that support with their 
opinion, and strongly reject all arguments challenging their opinion. They find 
it difficult to dissociate themselves from bad, yet supportive arguments, and 
even more difficult to evaluate  supporting and opposing arguments made by 
other people on the basis of the arguments’ moral quality. Thus the pattern of 
responses to this moral task makes the moral judgment competence of the partici-
pants visible. As their competence develops, people start to rate arguments 
                                                 
11 The common distinction between so-called ‘preference-tests’ and ‘production-tests’ does not apply 
here. Decisive is the distinction between moral attitude tests, which contain no task, and moral compe-
tence tests, like the MJT, which contain a difficult task, and cannot be faked upward (cf. Lind 2002). 
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more and more in regard to their moral quality rather than in regard to their 
opinion-agreement, and the whole pattern becomes more consistent in regard to 
their moral orientations and more differentiated in regard to their own opinion12.  
This competence aspect of moral behavior is indexed with the 
C-score, whereby the “C” stands for competence and cognitive aspect (for more 
details, see Lind, 2008 a). The C-score is calculated by analyzing the proportion 
of variance of an individual’s response pattern that is determined by the moral 
quality of the arguments rather than by their opinion agreement, their context, 
or by any of the possible combinations of these three design factors of the MJT. 
This proportion of variance is then multiplied by 100 to yield a score ranging 
from 0 to 10013. The affective aspect (the profile of preferences for the six types 
of moral orientations) is simply measured, like in attitude measurement, by av-
eraging the participants’ evaluations of the arguments representing each moral 
orientation. These scores can range from -4 (strongly reject) to +4 (strongly ac-
cept). 
For assessing the theoretical validity of test construction we 
have used two strategies. First we asked several Kohlberg-experts to rate the 
arguments’ on Kohlberg’s stage scale, and revised the arguments accordingly. 
Note that the arguments have not been submitted to some kind of empirical 
item selection in order to maximize their fit with statistical criteria. Second we 
used three well-corroborated theoretical predictions as validity criteria, namely 
the predictions a) that the preferences for the six Kohlberg-types of moral orien-
tations are clearly ordered from high acceptance of Stage-6 moral reasoning to 
high rejection of Stage-1 moral reasoning (cf. Rest, 1969), b) that the six types of 
moral orientations are correlated in a way that neighboring types are more 
                                                 
12 Note that there is no “consistency” or “differentiation” of behavior per se, but both attributes must be 
specified in some way to become unambiguous and measureable. 
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highly correlated than more distant stages, so the pattern of correlations form a 
‘quasi-simplex’ (Kohlberg, 1958), and c) that moral orientations and moral 
competences are ‘parallel’, that is, that they are highly correlated. All criteria of 
validity are clearly related to psychological theories. They are more rigorous 
than traditional psychometric criteria. The MJT fulfills them all very clearly and 
consistently. 
To test the hypothesis of affective-cognitive parallelism, we will 
use two methods. In the first analysis we divided the sample into nine sub-
samples according to their C-score range. In the first group are all participants 
with a C-score between 0 and 9, in the second group all with a C-score between 
10 and 19, and so on. Then we looked at each group’s profile of preferences for 
the six moral orientations typical for Kohlberg’s Stages. The parallelism hypo-
thesis implies a) that the higher the participants’ moral competence (C-score), 
the more clearly they prefer higher stage reasoning, and the more they reject 
lower stage reasoning. For obtaining estimates for effect size we looked at the 
moral preference ratings of groups with various levels of moral judgment com-
petence, analyzing polynomial contrasts for the preference profiles, and then 
converting the F-values to the effect size index r by the following formula, 
whereas dfj designates the number of categories minus 1, and dfi the number of 
cases minus 1, and rxy the (nonlinear) correlation coefficient (Cooper & Hedges, 
1994).  
 
Another way to formulate this hypothesis is that the preference 
for each Kohlbergian type of moral reasoning (as reflected by the judgments of 
the corresponding arguments) correlates in a predictable way with the partici-
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pants’ moral competence score: preferences for high stage reasoning should 
show a high positive correlation and this correlation should become lower and 
lower for preferences for lower stage reasoning. For preferences for the lowest 
stage of moral reasoning the correlation should be also high, but negative. To 
test this version of the parallelism hypothesis, we will therefore look at the pro-
files of six correlation coefficients. 
It should be noted that the a priori probability of such a com-
bined prediction is very small and, therefore, the falsifiability (Popper, 1968) 
and information value of this hypothesis is very high. There can be 720 possible 
outcomes, because there are six stages and the correlations with them can be 
ordered in 7! = 720 different ways. Thus, the probability of a predicted order of 
correlations is 1 divided by 720, that is, p = 0.0014. Because this hypothesis is 
formulated as a universal prediction, the probability of accidental corroboration 
is extremely small. 
The analysis of the parallelism hypothesis is based on MJT 
studies in Germany involving university students, apprentices, and prison in-
mates. 
Findings 
We have argued that Piaget’s hypothesis implies that the cogni-
tive aspect (represented by the C-index) and the affective aspect (represented by 
six attitude scales) correlate such that the higher the moral competence, the 
more lower stages of moral reasoning are rejected and the more higher (post-
conventional) stages are accepted. 
Early findings in Germany, where the first studies were done 
with the MJT, fully support Piaget’s parallelism theory. Figure 1 shows that, 
while all participants prefer higher to lower stages of moral orientations as cog-
nitive-developmental theory predicts (Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 1969), their prefer-
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ence for the higher stages (and the rejection of the lower stages) of moral orienta-
tion is the stronger the higher their moral judgment competence is. It should 
also be noted that preference and rejection are graded as a direct function of the 
stage of orientation, and that the relationship is linear and without any excep-
tion. This is an unusually strong support for an unusually risky hypothesis, and 
we can regard Piaget’s parallelism hypothesis as a well-founded cornerstone of 
moral development research.This judgment is further corroborated by many 
findings with very different samples in Germany and in many other countries. 
Studying university students and juvenile delinquents also revealed the same 
pattern of correlations as predicted from the theory (Lind, 2002). As predicted, 
the correlations are very marked and their gradation is fully in line with the 
hypothesis. They are mostly below r = -0.50 for the lowest stage, and above r = 
+0.50 for the highest stage, and of intermediate size for the intermediate stages 
(Figure 2). 
Until now the MJT has been translated into 39 languages and 
most have been certified as a cross-culturally valid measure of moral compe-
tence14. Thus the hypothesis of affective-cognitive parallelism could be tested in 
many different countries and cultures. It was clearly supported – without ex-
ception – in all studies that I am aware of. For example, studies of university 
students in five European countries (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Po-
land and Yugoslavia) revealed the same, invariant affective-cognitive parallel-
ism (Lind, 2002)15. Because of the apparent universality of affective-cognitive 
parallelism, this phenomenon is now used as one of three validation criteria for 
new sub-tests for the MJT as well as for validating translations of the MJT. All 
new versions of the MJT must fulfill this criterion (and two more criteria) in or-
der to be certified as valid, which ensures that all versions are not only semanti-
                                                 
14 See http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/mut/mjt-certification.htm#certified_versions 
15 The findings from many more countries can be found at the above link. I wish to thank all 
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cally but also pragmatically equivalent (Lind, 2008 a). It must be noted that in-
valid items were revised to maximize their theoretical and inter-cultural validi-
ty but not to maximize the correlation of the C-score with age, or the difficulty 
of the MJT. 
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1 Correlational parallelism between moral affect and cognition: Acceptance of each of the six 
Kohlbergian types of moral orientations as a function of participants’ moral judgment compe-
tence (C-score), MJT (index of moral judgment competence), in a sample of German first semes-
ter university students. Source: FORM-Project, 1977-1984 (see Lind, 2002). Interaction effect of 











































2 Correlational parallelism between moral affect and cognition in five different samples: 
Profiles of correlations between participants’ preferences of the six Kohlbergian types of 
moral orientation on the one hand (affective aspect) and the C-score (MJT) on the other 
(cognitive aspect), in samples of 1st semester university students (N = 2098), 5th semester 
university students (N = 812; both FORM-project), high school graduates (N= 516; also 
FORM; Lind, 1978), Swiss apprentices (N = 579; HASMU-project by Fritz Oser and his 
colleagues, reported in Lind, 2002), and juvenile prisoners (N = 58; Wischka, 1982). 
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Implications for Moral Psychology and Education 
Clearly, Piaget’s paradigm of distinct-yet-not-separate aspects 
sheds light in the different ways how we organize our educational systems and 
how we design the school curriculum regarding moral education and more. In 
the past, the separation of cognition and affect as different substances or compo-
nents had a great impact on the organization of our educational system, curricu-
lum construction and educational assessment and evaluation. The organization 
of our educational system reflects the component model and leaves little room 
for an integrative approach to moral education as implied by the aspect model. 
Each component, it seems, “has” its own teaching subject and department of 
education. Everyone trying to implement an integrative, affective-cognitive ap-
proach of moral education, can tell painful stories about the misfit of our insti-
tutions of education for such an approach. If moral education is to be effective, 
we must acknowledge that morality is as much a cognitive competence as it is 
an affective disposition, and that it is moral competence that must be fostered, 
not moral orientations. Because basic moral orientations seem to be inborn and 
found in all human beings, as Socrates had observed already (for experimental 
support see deWaal, 2008; Hamlin et al., 2007). But moral competence must be 
developed through experience and learning (Lind, 2009). 
Our studies let us conclude that fostering moral judgment com-
petence also strengthens principled moral reasoning and behavior. The more it 
is developed, the more clearly adolescents (and adults) discern the inadequacy 
of low stage reasoning, and the more strongly they adhere to moral principles 
in their reflection on moral decisions. Secondly, the ability to apply moral prin-
ciples to one’s judgment behavior also leads to better decision-making in gen-
eral. Participants with high ability clearly make a decision (in one or the other 
direction) yet they refrain mostly from taking too extreme stances on an issue, 
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whereas participants with low judgment competence tend either to take an ex-
treme stance (in either direction) or no stance at all. 
As Piaget has argued, and our research confirmed, without af-
fective and emotional arousal there is little learning and hardly a lasting effect 
of learning. And without taking the cognitive aspects of moral affects into ac-
count, there is no moral development from the level of black-and-white moral 
thinking (which is associated with a high probability to resort to violence as a 
means to “promote” the good) to the level of more integrated and differentiated 
moral judgment facilitating nonviolent ways of conflict resolution like moral 
discourse, mediation and peaceful negotiation. In other words, constructivist 
moral education based on Piaget’s parallelism theory of moral behavior and 
development eventually strengthens students’ decision-making capacity with-
out pushing them into one direction or the other (as indoctrination would do). 
Thus fostering students’ moral competence agrees well with the moral princi-
ples of a democratic way of life. It strengthens students’ ability to speak up and 
listen to others, and their ability to participate in a democratic discourse and 
non-violent conflict resolution (Lind, 2008 b). 
Conclusions 
The Dual-Aspect-Model means a progressive paradigm shift in 
moral psychological research and educational practice, which, it seems, has not 
yet been taken full advantage of. The aspect model overcomes the problems 
implied by the component model, rooted in the conceptual realism of Plato and 
Descartes. It has helped to design new methods of measurements which allow 
simultaneous assessment of cognitive and affective aspects of moral behavior 
(and of other behaviors as well, of course), and to detect new phenomenon of 
moral development and education. 
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Methodologically, a great amount of research supports both the 
fruitfulness of Piaget’ aspect model and the empirical validity of his parallelism 
hypothesis. Neither a purely ‘cognitive’ nor a purely ‘affective’ approach to the 
measurement of moral judgment behavior is warranted. Neither aspect can be 
adequately assessed without reference to the other. There is no pure structure of 
human behavior irrespective of content or direction and energy. When we talk 
about behavioral consistency, we always have to define consistency (or incon-
sistency) in regard to some behavioral standard, norm or principle. In contrast to 
chemistry, in psychology there is no consistency per se. Only when we define 
consistency in regard to some moral orientation, we can distinguish principled 
judgment from rigid judgment, or differentiated judgments from erratic judg-
ments (Eyferth, 1959). Neither is there pure affect or attitude irrespective of the 
cognitive processing of the situation which triggers the behavior. Assessing 
both aspects simultaneously allows us a) to distinguish moral consistency from 
rigidity of opinion, and b) it also lets us determine if a participant’s pattern of 
behavior exhibits clearly structured moral orientations, or no moral orientation 
at all, or a highly differentiated moral judgment.  
In many studies affect and cognition are misconceived of as 
separable components (Rest 1984; see also Beck, 1995, p. 117; Gibbs & Schnell, 
1985, p. 1078) or are even placed in separate domains of educational objectives 
(Krathwohl et al., 1964; Tomlinson-Keasey & Eisert, 1981). In some studies, 
moral cognition and affect have been not only separated (which is not possible, 
as we have seen) but have even been opposed to each other with the question as 
to which is the more important or more real component (Emler et al., 1983; Ho-
gan & Emler, 1995; Haidt, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Zajonc, 1980). Within the 
dual aspect paradigm, such an opposition becomes meaningless. Interestingly, 
the authors of these studies not only place morality in the affective domain and 
confine its assessment to attitude measurement (Emler et al., 1983; Zajonc, 1980) 
and to neurological imaging of emotional processes (Haidt, 2001; Greene & 
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Haidt, 2002), but they also show blatant disregard for the methodological para-
digm shift triggered by Piaget’s aspect model. This belief has lead to a stag-
nation of attitude research (Scott, 1968; Lind 2010 c). The component model has 
also negative consequences for educational research and educational practice. 
As Sprinthall et al. (1994) criticized that Krathwohl et al. (1964), in their taxon-
omy of educational objectives, artificially separated affect and cognition into 
different domains of behavior and so undermined an integrative approach to 
teaching and learning. “In the separation between the social and the cognitive,” 
the former AERA president Alan Schoenfeld (1999) noted, “some fundamen-
tally important issues such as affect and motivation have fallen between the 
cracks. We need to build new frameworks and perspectives that do justice to all 
of these. And we need new methods to inform the work done within those per-
spectives” (p. 5). 
The Dual-Aspect-Model suggested by Piaget proved to be a real 
paradigm shift in psychological research. It made it possible to create a new 
experimentally designed instrument, the Moral Judgment Test that allows us to 
measure the two aspects of moral behavior simultaneously without separating 
them as components. This, in turn, allowed us to test Piaget’s hypothesis of af-
fective-cognitive parallelism adequately. Our findings show with great clarity 
that there is indeed a strong parallelism: People prefer higher moral orientations, 
and reject lower moral orientations, the higher their ability to make moral judgments, 
that is, judgment based on moral orientations rather than on opinion-agree-
ment.  
The Dual-Aspect-Model has also opened up completely new 
fields of research into moral development and education (Lind 2010 b; 2008 b). 
We can, for example ask whether affective-cognitive parallelism is ubiquitous 
or not. In fact, there seem to be situations in which parallelism breaks down, 
like testing situations that involve ‘high stakes’ for the tested person. If partici-
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pants sense that their answers to the test will trigger gratifications or negative 
sanctions, they will try to do what they believe the test administrator (or his 
commissioner) expects of them. For example, if the test of moral judgment be-
havior is used for deciding on the admission to an educational program the par-
ticipants will have a strong incentive to fake the scores “upward” (Lind, 2002). 
The dissolution of cognitive-affective parallelism becomes evident in the classi-
cal study by Emler et al. (1983), in which participants are instructed to simulate 
the moral preferences of other people. This study demonstrated that people can 
simulate almost any moral preference, while we have strong evidence that they 
cannot simulate other people’s moral judgment competence, if this is higher 
than their own (Lind, 2002). Affective-cognitive parallelism may also break 
down when moral development regresses. As our research shows, moral com-
petence can regress when there are no opportunities to practice it, however, 
moral orientations do not. If the support through schooling ceases before stu-
dents have reached a critical level of moral development, the ability to apply 
these orientations in everyday life can erode dramatically16. 
  
                                                 
16 In the case of pseudo-regression, the opposite phenomenon may occur. Pseudo-regression or Raskolni-
kov syndrom (as Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969, named it after the character in Dostojevski’s novel Crime 
and Punishment) means that people start to prefer lower moral orientations than they actually have but 
they retain their judgment competencies. This has been observed in adolescents during their transition 
from high school to college, when they free themselves from the normative context of family life (see 
Lind, 2010 a). 
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